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23
sufficient time to make a proper map study. The exception to this occurred on the afternoon of
11 June.
The failure of commanders to keep abreast of the situation of subordinate units by
frequent visits themselves or by staff officers resulted in faulty reports misleading them in the
use of reserve units.
An almost complete lack of reconnaissance and intelligence of the enemy dispositions
was a serious fault on all levels.
The actions of K Company Commander are normally not to be commended, however, in
this particular situation it is noted that it did bring to the attention on higher commanders the
necessity for subordinates being offered time in which to make their plans. It is the actions of
the small unit commanders and leaders that, in the final analysis, determines the success or
failure of the attack. The fault did not rest on the Battalion Commander, he was simply under
pressure and was carrying out orders.
It is believed at the frontage assigned the platoons was not sufficiently wide and, that by
bunching an increasing number of casualties resulted. In terrain such as the Battalion was
operating over, squads should be assigned certain fields to clear before moving to another field.
Indian style tactics must be employed. Detailed maps should be available. Successive phase
lines should be set.
Where ground observation cannot be secured the use of liaison aircraft would have aided
Battalion and company commanders.
The failure of the Battalion attack plan, for 1800 hours 11 June, to provide for artillery
fire was faulty planning for the element of surprise had been lost. This was the only attack in
which the infantry attack could have been coordinated with the artillery fires. The full force of
the attack was lost. With artillery preparation the enemy position may well have been taken.
The confusion attending the assignment of E and G Companies to the 3rd Battalion on 11
June was the result of confused orders.
The withdrawals of the 3rd Battalion on the afternoon of 10 June and 11 June from front-
line positions could have resulted in a most serious situation. A strong, alert, aggressive enemy
could have struck quickly and jeopardized the entire Corps' position.
The ordering of the attachment of E Company to the 3rd Battalion on 11 June without
knowledge of its whereabouts on the part of the 3rd Battalion Commander or the Regimental S-2
or S-3 was an exhibition of very poor staff work in control. No time was allowed to contact E
Company had its whereabouts been known.
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