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latter being about 6 miles from the city. The inner ring was begun by Vauban in the early 19th
Century and finished by Napoleon III in 1866, and the outer ring was built by the Germans and
was finished in 1912. In World War II, Organization Todt improved and reinforced the forts and
added 11 batteries of artillery, the signal system and elaborate interconnecting field fortifications.
Hitler, against the advice of his Army staff, in the fall of 1944, personally ordered that
these forts be manned as a part of the defensive system.
10
The outer ring of forts was primarily underground with artillery pieces protruding only
slightly from revolving domed steel tyrants. Nothing would knock these guns out but direct hits
by bombs weighing 1000 pounds or more.
11
As an example of how impregnable this outer ring
of forts was, 240mm and 8 inch howitzers were not able to neutralize them and six weeks of of
close range direct fire by three 155mm guns (SP) was only able to damage a few gun turrets and
was not able to destroy any of them.
12
XX Corps of Third Army received sufficient gas on 4-6 September to resume the attack
and moved up to Metz in force.
13
The troops had been moving so rapidly across France that they had little knowledge of
the area to their front. The responsible headquarters had not been able to obtain, evaluate and
disseminate detailed information of the German troops and fortifications facing them, and
elements of two American divisions attempted to enter Metz from the northwest on 7 September
without knowing of the existence of these forts. Their attack continued through 14 September
but no penetration of the line of forts was effected.
On 14 September XX Corps ordered the 90th Infantry Division to relieve the attacking
elements and contain the fortified area west of the Moselle. XX Corps changed its main effort
ordered two divisions to cross the Moselle approximately 10 miles south of Metz. The Germans
by this time had been given sufficient time to organize their defenses and the river crossing met
strong resistance.
Because of the supply situation, Third Army was ordered on 25 September to assume the
defensive.
14
As a result the attack had to be stopped in a bridgehead. However, it outflanked
some of the Metz forts and provided a good position from which to resume the offensive when
ordered.
The 5th Infantry Division which was deployed in a bridgehead and astride the Moselle
south of Metz, decided, with the approval of Corps and Army Headquarters, to attack Fort
Driant, situated on the West Bank to the river south of Metz and one of the key forts in the outer
ring. This attack lasted from 3 October to 14 October and after receiving heavy casualties it
resulted in a withdrawal of the large task force formed for the attack. It was found in this attack
that the supporting artillery was of little value against the fort, that the engineer explosives
unavailable were inadequate for the task, that the coordination of fires between the various forts
was excellent, and that when the Germans retreated into the depths of the fort it was nearly
impossible the dig them out.
15
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